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Abstract 
We examine the tax-growth nexus in Zimbabwe using parametric and non-parametric analysis. We use a 
two stage estimation procedure that first generates efficiecy scores for the country using a Data 
Envelopment Approach. We use the efficiency scores in the second stage to normalise growth to get a 
proxy for potential economic growth. Using this potential growth we run a translog model that allows 
computation of time-varying elasticities of growth to changes in tax policy. We find growth being 
relatively inelastic to tax structure. We also find that the economy is inefficient with the dead weight loss 
6.2% of the studied period’s real GDP. The  most inefficient years were not only drought years but also 
years with poor economic governance contrary to claims by policymakers.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Elementary economic analysis of taxation primarily focuses on the tax burden. Under 
most situations, the primary burden of a tax is a decrease in economic activity, referred to as 
deadweight loss. A simple extension of the standard model, allowing for taxes on all goods and 
activities implies a reduction in economic activity in every market in the economy, and therefore, 
taxes would be expected to negatively affect economic growth in an economy. However, that 
simple analysis ignores a number of other issues. Most importantly, if the government uses the 
collected tax revenues to fund investment in social goods, especially goods resulting in external 
benefits (infrastructure, education, agricultural research and extension and public health, for 
example), the economic growth rate could be positively influenced by taxation. Furthermore, if 
money is transferred from people with low marginal utilities of income (rich) to people with high 
marginal utilities of income (poor), while revenues are additionally used to fund public 
investment, then the economy can gain from this 'double-dividend' of taxation. Therefore, 
measuring the economic effect of taxation ought to be a simple exercise in determining whether 
or not the benefits of government expenditures exceed the costs of taxation.  
Unfortunately, it is not easy to directly determine the net benefits of taxation and, 
therefore, to determine whether or not taxes are benevolent. For example, if taxation pushes 
economic activity underground, we would find that it lowers economic growth when, in fact, it is 
merely shifting economic activity from the measured economy to the unmeasured economy, that 
is, we are overstating the negative effects of taxation on economic growth. On the other hand, if 
many markets are characterized by low elasticities, so that economic activity is not significantly 
affected, but the government purchases imported goods with the tax revenues, then GDP and 
economic growth will be lower due to the dual leakages, taxation and importation. Therefore, a 
complete analysis of the economic effects of the fiscus on an economy would examine the 
impact of expenditure and taxes. The results reported in this paper represent the first stage of 
research into these issues conducted on the Zimbabwean economy. Rather than comparing the 
benefits of government expenditure with the costs of taxation, we examine the relationship 
between taxation and economic growth. 
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We proceed by investigating Zimbabwean tax policy, the expected effect of those tax 
policies and relevant research in section 2. In section 3, we discuss the analytical framework 
used to measure the impact of taxes on economic growth. We provide a preliminary analysis of 
the data, including the control for unobservable economic variables, in section 4. We also present 
and discuss the results of the analysis in section 4, and provide concluding remarks in section 5. 
2. BACKGROUND 
(a) Economic Growth and Taxes: A Review of the Literature 
Theoretically and empirically, it has been shown that taxes affect the allocation of 
resources; and often distort the underlying behaviour of economic agents. Regarding economic 
growth, taxes influence the labour-leisure trade-off and investment decisions. Due to the 
importance of labour and capital in determining economic growth it is surprising that the 
relationship between economic growth and taxes has not featured more prominently in previous 
researches. In what is now referred to as Harberger's superneutrality conjecture Harberger (1964) 
argued that there is a link between tax mix and economic growth. Tax mix, he argued, does not 
alter labour-leisure trade-off or investment to sufficiently influence economic growth. Hall 
(1968) developed a savings-consumption model and found that tax changes only led to transitory 
changes in growth. Hall, who applied a neoclassical growth model, relied on exogenous technical 
change and population growth which, by assumption, are not likely to be significantly influenced 
by the economy's tax structure. More specifically, if exogenous technical progress is the main 
determinant of economic growth, tax policy can only affect long-run income and not long-run 
economic growth, primarily because capital accumulation only covers depreciation and 
population growth in these models. 
Models of endogenous growth, however, may provide a theoretical link between 
economic growth and tax policy.  Endogenous growth models allow for continued capital 
accumulation, beyond depreciation and population growth in the steady-state, for example, 
capital accumulation depends upon the net return to investment, which is affected by tax policy. 
For example, Lucas (1990), Jones and Manuelli (1990), King and Robelo (1990) and, more 
recently, Yamarik (2001) all argue that economic growth is retarded by taxation. Analyses by 
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Pecorino (1993) suggest economic growth could be increased significantly, from 1.53 per cent 
per annum to 2.56 per cent per annum in the US if the tax mix were shifted away from income 
taxes towards non-distortionary consumption taxes. However, Stokey and Robelo (1995) and 
Mendoza, Milesi-Ferrett, and Asea (1997), who also made use of endogenous growth models in 
their analyses, found negligible negative effects of taxation on economic growth in developed 
economies. As an example of the small effects, Engen and Skinner (1996) established that a 5 
per cent reduction in average tax rates in the US would likely add 0.25 per cent per year to 
economic growth. Although the yearly effect is small, accumulation of that quarter percent over 
36 years from 1960 implies an overall increase of 7.5 per cent of GDP, approximately $500 
billion in 1996 (calculation reported in Engen and Skinner, 1996). The studies differ in that 
Mendoza et al. (1997) first compute aggregate effective tax rates (for consumption, labour 
income, capital income) from revenue data and national accounts. Engen and Skinner (1996) do 
not use such artificially constructed effective tax rates, they rather use marginal tax rates in their 
cross country studies. 
An important feature of these models is the assumption that taxes are returned to 
consumers, efficiently - an assumption that may not be realistic in developing countries. 
Although a consensus appears to be emerging regarding the impact of tax policy on economic 
growth in the developed world, primarily the US, less analysis has been done in the developing 
world. However, the research that has been undertaken suggests that the impact of taxation in 
developing economies is larger than it is in developed economies. Marsden (1990) groups 20 
developing countries into high tax and low tax regimes and finds that the low tax group averaged 
7.3 per cent growth, but the high tax group only averaged 1.1 per cent. Wang and Yip (1992) 
show that the structure of taxation is more important than the level of taxation in explaining 
economic growth in Taiwan from 1954 to 1986. Their empirical estimates show significant and 
negative impacts of specific taxes on economic growth, but the effect of total taxation is not 
significant. Kim (1998) compares economic growth and taxation in the US with economic 
growth and taxation in Korea. According to his analysis, 35 per cent of the difference between 
US and Korean economic growth can be explained by differences in the tax structure between 
the two countries. Kerr and MacDonald (1999) find mixed evidence that the ratio of indirect 
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taxes to direct taxes negatively and significantly affects economic growth in seven Asian 
economies. On the other hand, Tanzi and Shome (1992) uncover no obvious uniformities 
between the tax policies of eight Asian economies concluding, "...tax structure may become 
largely irrelevant when macroeconomic problems become predominant, and the distortions 
created by the tax system become of a second order magnitude..." Due to the structural problems 
in African economies and the results of Tanzi and Shome's analysis, we might expect the effects 
of taxation to be minimal in Africa. Although Africa has received less attention than Asia, 
Skinner (1987) estimates the effect of taxation in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1965 to 
1982. He finds that personal and corporate income taxes have a significant and negative effect on 
economic growth; trade taxes also reduce economic growth, indirectly, in the region, while sales 
and excise taxes have no significant effect on economic growth. Based upon Skinner's analysis, 
we tentatively conclude that the tax structure may not be largely irrelevant on the continent, as 
was implied by Tanzi and Shome. For a number of reasons, the impact of taxation in the 
developed world is likely to be different from its impact in the developing world, especially in 
Africa, therefore, taxation in Africa which has received little attention to date, merits further 
study. Importantly, developing countries do not have the infrastructure to adequately police tax 
compliance; thus, shifts in tax policies in developing countries, especially increases in income 
taxes, are likely to push economic activity underground.  
Furthermore, governments in developing countries may not return taxes back to the 
public in an efficient manner (by not adequately investing in public goods). Skinner (1987) finds 
that a 5 per cent increase in public investment, financed through taxation, reduces growth by a 
approximately 0.6 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1974 and 1982. Governments might 
be corrupt or otherwise not trustworthy, for example, by squandering resources on white 
elephants, by changing tax policies in an ad hoc manner, or by taking control of economic 
resources. McMillan and Masters (2000) develop a model of economic growth and government 
policy based on time-consistent behaviour showing that government commitment devices 
improve the incentives for economic agents to invest, beyond subsistence levels, and thus, are 
likely to improve economic growth. Finally, government agents have the incentive to increase 
the tax base of taxed activities. In the case of developing countries, which often rely on corporate 
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taxes imposed on large (often state-owned) companies, the tax structure provides incentives to 
increase the profits of these companies, often to the detriment of competition, which could have 
significant economic growth effects. Gordon and Wilson (1999) develop a theoretical model 
showing that incentives within government are likely to be just as important in explaining 
government behaviour as are incentives in explaining other economic agents behaviour. 
We seek to contribute to literature by analysing the efficiency effects of tax policy on 
economic growth in Zimbabwe. We further seek to establish the deadweight loss that tax policy 
in Zimbabwe induced on the economy. 
(b) Zimbabwean Tax Policy and Growth: 1984-2009
1
 
 
 
Figure 1: Real GDP Growth Rate for Zimbabwe 
Source: World Bank: African Development Indicatos (2011) 
 
                                                          
1
 The data we found is complete starting in 1984 hence the choice of the study period. A longer period would have 
been more informative. 
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One outstanding observation from figure 1 is that real GDP growth has not been 
associated with tax burden and tax mix between 1984 and 1999. The era beginning 2000 seems 
to indicate that it has somehow become positively associated with growth although in the same 
period a significant policy of quasi-fiscal financing of the budget was unleashed. Major spikes in 
growth reflect the vagaries of climate. In 1984, 1987, 1992, 1995, 2002, 2005 and 2008 there 
were droughts. The case for the year 2000 concides with the land reform program and sanctions 
imposed on Zimbabwe. Tax mix which is a ratio of indirect to direct taxes has been quite stable 
and sharply rose since 2000. A number of reasons can be cited. Firstly, in 2002 value added tax 
was introduced. It has been shown that VAT is more revenue productive than sales tax. 
Secondly, in 2001, Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) was established. Probably, revenue 
collection performance and tax administration efficiency improved significantly hence a surge in 
the tax mix ratio. Thirdly, a wave of de-industrialisation that started since 1999 following the 
start of the emotive land reform program meant that the formal economy shrinked and hence the 
direct tax base. Further, it meant that economic activity shifted from the formal to the informal 
economy as formal employment fell and retrenched workers resorted to informal and 
underground activities for sustainable livelihoods. In the same period, in spite of the biting 
foreign currency constraints, processed food imports rose significantly to fill the gap created by 
the ailing food processors that were operating below capacity. Therefore, indirect taxes rose 
through the growth in the trade taxes component against declining direct tax revenue. However, 
the tax burden also rose significantly since 2003. The imposition of international financial 
restrictions (de facto sanctions) on Zimbabwe closed all avenues for international finance and as 
such implied over-reliance on tax policy and printing of money hence a surge in the tax burden. 
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Borrowing from the endogenous economic growth framework and Data Envelopment 
Analysis (Koopmans, 1951; Farrell, 1957), we consider a two-stage procedure to estimate the 
relationship between fiscal policy and economic growth. The initial stage of the model uses Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to provide estimates of exogenous factors for which we do not 
have data, while the second stage uses the first stage estimates to normalize the economic growth 
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rates, yielding unbiased estimates of the relationship between potential economic growth and 
taxation. Problems of endogeneity are handled by the normalisation of actual GDP by the 
efficiency score. Branson and Lovell (2001) developed the two-stage procedure, although we 
modify the second stage estimating equation to take into account Zimbabwean features of the 
scaling factors and the time series features that are apparent in the data, while also considering a 
different empirical specification. 
 
(a) A Simple Theoretical Growth Model 
Suppose that the Zimbabwean economy is governed by a constant returns to scale 
production function of the form: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐹 𝐴𝑡 , 𝐾𝑡 , 𝑁𝑡       (1) 
Defining Yt as GDP, At as technology at time t, Kt as stock of capital in the economy at time t, Nt 
as human capital at time t. Taking the natural log of the production function assuming the 
production function is Cobb-Douglas, differentiating with respect to time and manipulating 
slightly yields the following growth equation: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜎𝑎𝑎𝑡 + 𝜎𝑘𝑘𝑡 + 𝜎𝑛𝑛𝑡      (2) 
Defining 𝜎𝑎 + 𝜎𝑘 + 𝜎𝑛 = 1 due to CRS – with sigmas as elasticities of growth to changes in 
technology, capital and human capital stock. However, we do not formally develop a model of 
endogenous growth. Because we do not assume exogenous technical progress, we are analysing 
a model more akin to endogenous than exogenous growth. The lower case letters in equation (2) 
represent log growth rates of their upper case counterparts, and the subscripts represent the input 
elasticities for inputs 𝑖 =  𝑎, 𝑘, 𝑙 . In order to incorporate endogenous growth concepts, we 
presume that tax policy directly and indirectly affects the growth rates of each of these 
production inputs, as well as their appropriate elasticities, as suggested by Engen and Skinner 
(1996). Intuitively, income, business, consumption taxes and user fees alter the incentives to 
invest in physical and human capital, therefore, they will alter the growth rates of human and 
physical capital inputs, as well as technical progress. Furthermore, changes in tax policy are also 
likely to influence the relative cost of physical and human capital, and research and development 
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expenditures; therefore, changes in tax policy are expected to affect the input elasticities for 
human capital, physical capital and technical progress as well. 
We consider, as suggested by Branson and Lovell (2001), two separate measures of tax 
policy. One is the tax burden, or the ratio of total real tax revenues to real GDP. The other is the 
tax mix, or the ratio of indirect taxes to direct taxes. Because these tax policies may influence 
any or all of the variables on the right hand side of equation (2), we will examine economic 
growth as a function of these two tax policies and other economic growth determinants 
(represented by the vector Z): 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡 = 𝐻 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑡 , 𝑍𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡      (3) 
Defining 𝜉𝑡  as a stochastic error term with the classical regression assumptions holding. 
Empirically, equation (3) is difficult to estimate due to the fact that other important factors, as 
represented by Z, cannot be included in the model, because they cannot be observed. If the 
variables in Z were uncorrelated with the tax burden and the tax mix, we could estimate equation 
(3) without concern for bias. However, the assumption of no correlation between the unobserved 
variables in Z, the tax burden, and the tax mix is absurd. For example, oil shocks, which in the 
past have led to inflation jitters around the world, and thus increased the demand for gold have 
positively affected growth in Zimbabwe. Mineral extraction fees and profits taxes, especially for 
mining companies would also have risen during these time periods. Therefore, it is hard to 
imagine a case where changes affecting economic growth may not also affect tax collection. One 
option for dealing with presumed correlation is estimation with the use of instrumental variables; 
however, finding an instrument that is correlated with Z but not with the tax mix or tax burden is 
difficult. For that reason, it is desirable to find an alternative approach. 
 
(b) Empirical Review 
(i)  Data Envelopment Analysis 
One approach that lends itself well to the problem of endogeneity, although not 
parametric, is based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA uses linear programming to 
search for the best frontier without using statistical techniques in the analysis. Parametric 
approaches use statistical techniques to estimate parameters. As the name suggests, the technique 
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envelops the data so that observations on the "edge of the envelope" represent economic 
frontiers. Once the "edge of the envelope" has been uncovered, it is possible to determine how 
far the remaining observations are from the frontier using a simple scaling factor. In our analysis, 
we are searching for the smallest reciprocal tax burden consistent with the observed growth rate, 
given all other tax burdens and growth rates observed in the economy over the time horizon. The 
effect of the model in this scenario is that the scaling factors can be used to normalize 
production, which in this case is economic growth. Therefore, normalized economic growth is 
really potential economic growth. If we observe the real GDP growth rate (growth), the ratio of 
GDP to direct taxes (Y/D), and the ratio of GDP to indirect taxes (Y/I) from 1984 to 2009, we 
can solve the following linear programm: 
 
 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑡  with respect to 𝜃 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜆 
 Subject to: 
                           𝜃𝑡  
𝑌
𝐷
 
𝑝
≥  𝜆𝑡  
𝑌
𝐷
 
𝑡
  
             𝜃𝑡  
𝑌
𝐼
 
𝑝
≥  𝜆𝑡  
𝑌
𝐼
 
𝑡
  
             𝜆𝑡𝑔𝑦
𝑡 ≥ 𝑔𝑦
𝑝
  
            𝜆𝑡 ≥ 0  ∀  𝑡 ∈  1, … , 𝑇   
             𝜆𝑡 = 1      (4) 
       
The programme given by (4) is solved T=26 times once for each year in the data because 
each year is a decision making unit that has to be evaluated against the rest. For the year denoted 
with a "p", the program tries to find the smallest increase in that year's reciprocal indirect and 
direct tax burden consistent with the constraints.
2
 The first two constraints require that the 
increase in the direct (indirect) tax burden as measured by the reciprocal direct (indirect) tax 
share of income cannot exceed a linear combination of all other years' tax burdens equivalently 
measured. The linear program is solved using the reciprocal shares of direct and indirect taxes to 
                                                          
2
 Equivalently, this implies finding the largest increase in that year’s non-reciprocal indirect and direct tax burdens. 
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real GDP. Both the tax mix and the tax burdens can be recovered from these two reciprocals, for 
example, the tax mix is the ratio of the reciprocal direct tax share of income to the reciprocal 
indirect tax share of income: 𝑚 =
𝑌
𝐷 
𝑌
𝐼 
=
𝐼
𝐷
. The third constraint also requires that a linear 
combination of all other years' growth rates cannot be exceeded by the year "p" growth rate. 𝜆𝑡  
are weights that guarantee a convex combination of the remaining years besides the one being 
evaluated. The final T+1 constraint forces the linear combinations to be convex and non-
negative.  
The construction of the problem requires only positive inputs and outputs while resulting 
in solution values of 𝜃𝑡  < 1 for all years. Given the fact that real growth rates are occasionally 
negative an alternative specification is analysed. The procedure used based on input reciprocals 
is invariant to output translations (Lovell and Pastor, 1995); therefore, we take the ratio 
𝑌𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
×
100 to be a proxy growth rate which is the equivalence of us adding a constant 1 (one) to each 
year’s growth rate to make it positive and proceed with the analysis. We follow Lovell and 
Pastor (1995) who argue that such an aprroach leads to translation invariance.  
Regarding interpretation, the resulting 𝜃𝑡  indicates how well the economy performed, 
despite the current year's direct and indirect tax burden. A more useful interpretation is that it 
measures the degree to which the economy is performing below the level it ought to be 
performing given the current fiscal state. For example, a value of unity means that the economy 
managed its growth rate (the growth rate was not exceeded by a convex combination of other 
years' growth rates), even though that year's total tax burden was relatively large (not exceeded 
by a convex combination of any other years' tax burdens). In other words, non-tax influences on 
economic growth are more favourable, as 𝜃𝑡  approaches unity. The procedure is similar in 
concept to removing business cycle fluctuations that are, in this case, related to the fiscal 
situation in the economy. Smaller values represent an economic growth rate and a total tax 
burden exceeded by a convex combination of other years' growth rates and tax burdens such that 
economic growth in that year was low despite low tax burdens implying economic conditions 
were unfavourable in that year.  
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Following the calculation of all 𝜃𝑡 , the economic growth rate is normalized to correct the 
data for the relatively favourable and unfavourable economic conditions and other non-tax 
influences, which affect the business cycle and tax collections. Estimation, using the normalized 
growth data, follows translog model and controls for potential time-series problems, especially 
non-stationarity and serial correlation. 
(ii) Empirical Model – Translog model 
The DEA computes a scaling factor for every year, 𝜃𝑡 , which is normalized on the unit 
simplex. Although it is not always possible to observe tZ , it is possible to observe 𝜃𝑡 , which is 
used as a proxy. Unlike Branson and Lovell (2001), the computed scaling factor is used to filter 
GDP fluctuations out of the system, so that the second stage equation (5) is used to estimate the 
tax determinants of potential GDP growth: 
 
1
𝜃𝑡
𝑌𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
 = ℎ 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡                 (5) 
𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡 = ℎ 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡                  (6)   
  
In specification (5), 𝑤𝑡  , represents a stochastic error term and 𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡  is the growth rate of real 
potential GDP. The estimated specification (7) is a translog function of the tax burden and the 
tax mix. 
𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑡 +
1
2
𝛼3 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 
2 +
1
2
𝛼4 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑡 
2 +
𝛼5 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 . 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡                 (7) 
 
The variable pgrowth is the normalised growth.  A priori we expect 𝛼1 , 𝛼2 , 𝛼5  > 0; 𝛼3 , 𝛼4 <
0. From the translog specification in equation (7), time-varying elasticities for changes in 
potential growth with respect to changes in the tax burden and the tax mix can be calculated. 
Those elasticities are: 
𝜀 𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡 ℎ𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛
𝑡 = (𝛼1 + 𝛼3𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑡).
𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑡
𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡 ℎ𝑡
  
𝜀 𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡 ℎ𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑚 𝑖𝑥
𝑡 = (𝛼2 + 𝛼4𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡).
𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑥 𝑡
𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡 ℎ𝑡
               (8) 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 DEA results 
Since it is difficult to present all the 26 efficiency scores, we have taken era averages without 
losing the meaning of the results. 
Table 1: Results of DEA
3
 
Period
4
 Efficiency 
(theta) 
Returns to scale 
Constant 
returns 
Variable 
returns 
Scale  Returns to 
scale 
1984-1985
5
 0.935 0.626 0.935 0.670 Decreasing  
1986-1990
6
 0.970 0.835 0.970 0.862 Decreasing  
1991-1995
7
 0.943 0.817 0.943 0.867 Decreasing  
1996-2000
8
 0.979 0.895 0.979 0.913 Decreasing 
2001-2008
9
 0.871 0.550 0.871 0.617 Decreasing  
2009
10
 0.978 0.856 0.978 0.875 Decreasing 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
In terms of the broad economic eras, Table 1 shows that period 1996-2000 had the best 
economic performance with an efficiency score of 0.979. The economy was 97.9% efficient. The 
year 1996 is regarded as the year of glory for Zimbabwe with a real growth rate of 10.3%. On the 
other hand, the economy was 97.8% efficient in 2009 although the epochs do not have the same 
length hence averaging distorts some outcomes. The dollarisation policy and sound economic 
management explain the efficiency in the relevant eras. However, the economy is still operating 
below capacity and is still in great need for revitalization.  
                                                          
3
 Detailed DEA results can be obtained from the author 
4
 The grouping is based on major economic eras in Zimbabwe 
5
 Socialist policy era,  that had heavy government presence 
6
 Socialist policy era that had heavy government presence 
7
 Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) 
8
 Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) 
9
 Economic crisis years for Zimbabwe 
10
 Dollarization and economic revival dispensation 
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The 1986-1990 period ranks third with an efficiency of 97%. This era registered positive 
growth for all the years. The ESAP period ranks fourth with a 94.3%. Of course structural 
adjustments do not have immediate effects and as such their lagged effects were felt in the 1996-
2000 era that we showed to be the most efficient. 
The worst era is the 2001-2008 with an efficiency of 87.1%. During this period, the 
economy stagnated with hyperinflation, deteriorating political and economic governance and 
economic sanctions. For example, at the peak of the crisis in 2008 economic growth stood at 
negative 17%. Inspite of the largest reciprocal tax burden, non tax influences were unfavourable. 
Generally, the economy’s efficiency has been coming down over the years. Examples of factors 
underpinning the decline include drought in 2005, fuel crises, currency crises, sanctions, political 
impasse in the country, brain drain and hyperinflation among others. Although 2004 ranks 
among the most efficiecnt years, it had the highest tax burden about 33% of GDP suggesting that 
non-tax influences were favourable to drive the economy inspite of such a large burden. The 
years between 2005 and 2008 had a tax burden just below 16% of GDP with the lowest being 3% 
of GDP in 2008. This is evidence of the shrinkage of the tax base due to deindustrialisation, 
brain drain and excessive informalisation of the economy (bearing in mind that the informal 
sector is hard to tax). 
We also use the efficiency score to proxy the potential GDP in USD terms and calculate 
the dead weight loss as the difference between potential and actual growth in each year in the 
sample period (see Figure 2 and Table 2). 
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Figure 2: Actual, potential growth and efficiency score for Zimbabwe: 1984-2009
11
 
 
A look at figure 2 reveals an interesting phenomenon. The efficiency score maps out recessions 
and booms so accurately for example in 1985, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1999, 2003, 2004 and 2008. 
Each efficiency score is directly and positively correlated with economic performance. 
 
Table 2: Estimated dead weight loss due to inefficiency 
Year Potential GDP (USD 
billion) 
(1) 
Actual GDP (USD 
billion) 
(2) 
Dead weight loss 
(USD billion): 
(1)-(2) 
Dead weight (% of 
Actual GDP) 
1984-1985 9.43 8.81 0.62 7.04 
1986-1990 26.2 25.4 0.8 3.15 
1991-1995 30.9 29.1 1.8 6.19 
1996-2000 34.8 34.0 0.8 2.35 
2001-2008 44.7 38.9 5.8 14.9 
2009 36.9 36.1 0.8 2.22 
Total 182.93 172.31 10.62 6.16 
                                                          
11
 The growth rates are here defined consistently with the definition used in the DEA stage where growth equals 
Yt/Yt-1 and potential growth is Yt /(θtYt-1). 
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Table 2 depicts estimates of potential economic growth and the dead weight loss. 
Strikingly, the most inefficient era is the crisis period (2001-2008) with a dead weight loss 
amounting to 15% of actual GDP. The most efficient era is 1996-2000 and 2009 which concide 
with the after effects of ESAP and continual structural reform under ZIMPREST, and 
dollarisation efforts under the government of national unity which was formed in March 2009 
respectively. The deadweight loss stands at about 2% of GDP. 
The cumulative dead weight loss is approximately 6.2% of actual GDP for the 26 years. 
However, years under Structural Adjustment Programs 1991 to 1999 show marked reduction in 
inefficiency. Thus, the Washington Consensus was not really missing the mark on the overall. If 
only economic governance endeavoured to improve economic efficiency Zimbabwe would have 
been completely different from what it is now. There would only probably be need for strategic 
and longterm aid. The country would not have ambitiously pursued inflationary finance that led 
to ultimate collapse of the economy. Such resources unlocked by efficiency would free up 
resources for poverty reduction. Besides, the country would not have incurred the debilitating 
external debt it accumulated over the years. The poorest performance is not only in the years 
Zimbabwe had severe droughts such as 1987, 1992, 1995, 2002, 2005 and 2008, but also in years 
with poor economic governance such as the post 2000 era before dollarisation in 2009. So the 
popular belief among policymakers in Zimbabwe that our growth is constrained by adverse 
climatic conditions is a fallacy.  
4.2 Stationarity tests 
Given that we are dealing with time series data, it is imperative to analyse the stationarity 
properties of the data. Table 3 reports the unit root test results based on ADF test procedure. All 
variables except the residuals of the long run model were found to be non-stationary in levels at 
5% significance level or higher. 
 
 Table 3: Stationarity tests 
Variable In levels First difference Second difference 
Trend & drift Drift only None  None  None  
pgrowth -2.86 -2.97* -0.11 -5.37*** 
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growthy -3.37* -2.32 -0.34 -5.94*** 
 
taxburden -2.4 -2.04 -0.72 -3.09*** 
 
Taxmix -1.18 0.182 0.966 0.052 -1.995** 
 
Residuals -3.26* -2.71* -2.78*** 
  
Note: *** means significant at 1% and ** at 5% and *at 10%  based on ADF critical values 
 
Table 3 depicts that potential growth (pgrowth), actual growth (growthy), and taxburden are all 
I(1) at 1% level of significance but taxmix is I(2) at 5% significance level. However, the linear 
combination of the variables, that is, the residuals are stationary in levels suggesting a possibility 
of cointegration. 
4.3 The Translog model results 
We proceed to run a translog model in order to be able to determine time varying 
elasticities of potential growth to changes in tax policy. The results are reported in Table 4. Our 
objective is to measure the efficiency effects of tax policy on economic growth and possibly 
measure the responsiveness of economic growth to tax policy. Table 4 details the translog 
results. 
 
Table 4: Translog model results: Dependent variable is actual growth and potential growth
12
 
Variable Model: growth13 Model: pgrowth 
intercept 0.906 
(0.0001) 
0.924 
(0.0000) 
taxburdentaxmix  1.162* 
(0.0674) 
0.247 
(0.163) 
taxburden 0.449 
(0.719) 
0.942** 
(0.014) 
taxmix  0.006 
(0.976) 
0.194*** 
(0.0020) 
htaxburdensq14  -7.779 
(0.139) 
-9.00*** 
(0.0000) 
htaxmixsq -0.087 
(0.415) 
-0.129*** 
(0.0003) 
R-squared 0.38 0.84 
R-squared bar 0.23 0.79 
                                                          
12
 P-values given in brackets 
13
 *** means significant at1%, ** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10% 
14 htaxburdensq and htaxmixsq are the squared terms in a translog model 
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DW 1.58 1.62 
F 2.5* 
(0.065) 
20.5*** 
(0.0000) 
Breush-Godfrey  serial correlation 
LM test 
1.67 
(0.433) 
0.63 
(0.729) 
White heteroscedasticity test 3.86 
(0.869) 
9.58 
(0.296) 
Jarque-Bera normality test 5.28* 
(0.07) 
2.600(0.272) 
 
 Modelling actual growth on tax variables produces an weakly significant model and a p-
value for the F-statistic equal to 0.065. Only the interactive term is significant at 10% and has a 
positive influence on economic growth. A 0.1 unit increase in either taxburden or taxmix holding 
one of the two constant leads to a 1.2 increase in growth.  
However, after normalising actual growth by the efficiency score, we get a proxy for 
potential growth. The translog model for this variable is very significant overally at less than 1%. 
The explanatory power has more than doubled to 0.84 compared with 0.38 for the actual growth 
model. We subject the model to a serial correlation test and we find that the model does not 
suffer from this pathology. The B-G statistic is 0.63 with a p-value of 0.729, which is 
insignificant and thus failing to reject the null of no serial correlation. Likewise, the White 
heteroscedasticity test indicates that the model is both not mispecified and does not suffer from 
heteroscedasticity with a p-value of 0.272 for the Chi-sqaure statistic of 9.58. The null of 
homoscedasticity is not rejected. The Jarque-Bera test also fails to reject the null of normality of 
residuals of the model hence classical statistical tests can be applied confidently. However, the 
sample under study is small but these tests are asymptotic hence the need to interpret results with 
caution. 
From the results in Table 4 we see that a 0.1 unit increase in either of taxburden and 
taxmix holding the other constant raises potential growth by 0.25*taxburden or 0.25*taxmix 
points. On the other hand, a 0.1 unit increase in taxburden raises potential growth by 0.94 points. 
This implies that in the earlier stages of economic development, a heavier presence of 
government in the economy is beneficial for purposes of taxing to provide public goods. 
Similarly, a 0.1 points increase in taxmix in favour of indirect taxes raises potential growth by 
0.19. Indirect taxes have beed identified to enhance economic efficiency hence the positive 
impact on growth. Theoretically, the model is consistent: all a priori sign expectations have been 
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met. The results also show that there are diminishing returns to tax policy. As the tax burden 
increases to higher levels and taxmix likewise, then potential economic growth starts to decline. 
One of the possible reasons is the pushing of economic activity into the informal sector and 
increased tax evasion in the formal sector. A repressive fiscal policy is expected to dampen both 
consumption and investment hence negatively impacting economic growth. 
The ability of theta (efficiency) score to capture the effects of non-tax influences on 
growth should be accorded the prominance it deserves. Before filtering growth for business cycle 
fluctuations by the theta, the model had very poor explanatory (predictive) power. Once 
normalised, the explanatory (predictive) power went up significantly. Thus, one can safely 
exploit the DEA approach to proxy potential economic growth. 
   
4.4 Time Varying Elasticities 
We examine the responsiveness of potential growth to changes in tax structure over the 
period of study. This is a dynamic concept. We also use the point elasticity measure but this may 
not capture the dynamism the time varying principle advocates for. Tax policy undergoes several 
changes year after year and potential growth may respond differently. We find that potential 
growth has been relatively inelatic to changes in tax policy. We also find that in 1984-1985 the 
growth elasticity to taxburden is -0.071 (0.071% for every 1% increase in tax burden). For the 
1986-1990 and 1991-1995 periods the growth elasticity to tax burden is -0.217% for a 1% 
increase in tax burden. The largest elasticity occurred in the 1996-2000 reaching -0.267. The 
elasticity to tax burden has been decreasing in the 2000s. Perhaps, a shift by government towards 
greater recurrent expenditure and less towards social expenditure programs such as education 
and health that have positive externalities can explain. However, responsiveness of growth to tax 
mix was fairly constant at about 0.11% for the three periods 1986-1990, 1991-1995 and 1996-
2000. The results indicate that a policy shift towards indirect taxes increases growth (although 
growth is relatively inelastic to tax mix changes). On the other hand, increasing the tax burden 
would certainly reduce economic growth. However, the tax elasticity to tax burden was slightly 
positive in 2009 but the tax mix fell to -0.42% suggesting that an over-reliance on indirect taxes 
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as is the current situation in Zimbabwe where indirect taxes account for more than 50% of total 
revenue collected by government negatively impacts growth. 
Table 5: Average time varying elasticities of growth for Zimbabwe with respect to: 
Period Taxburden 
using calculus 
on translog 
Taxburden 
using point 
elasticity
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Taxmix using 
calculus on 
translog 
Taxmix using 
point elasticity 
1984-1985 -0.071 - 0.096 - 
1986-1990 -0.217 -0.336 0.114 0.433 
1991-1995 -0.216 -0.023 0.114 0.099 
1996-2000 -0.267 -0.696 0.117 -0.198 
2001-2008 -0.158 -0.263 0.081 -0.293 
2009 0.035 -0.004 -0.419 -0.036 
Sources: Authors’s calculations 
 
The elasticity of potential growth to tax mix has been fairly negative and between -0.08% and -
0.42% for every 1% increase in taxmix. The elasticity to taxmix of economic growth also 
increased in the 1996-2000 period. In the post dollarisation era, the elasticity of economic growth 
to tax burden has risen sharply to 0.42% although it is negative. Therefore, there is need to shift 
away from indirect taxes. However, a policy overemphasing a tax structure in favour of indirect 
taxes may be counterproductive. The elasticities have been falling in the 2000s, the very period 
in which tax mix shot up.  
The elasticity results calculated using point estimation differ much from the time-varying 
elasticities calculated using calculus. However, the two results agree that growth is relatively 
inelastic to tax burden and mix changes. Of course, elasticity to tax burden rose up sharply in the 
1996-2000 period to -0.7%. Prior to 1995, growth elasticity to tax mix was positive and became 
negative since 1996. This method is linear but the translog based result is non-linear and that 
makes it approximate reality better. 
5. Conclusion 
 
                                                          
15
 Point elasticity is calculated as   
∆𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡 ℎ𝑡
∆𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑡
.
𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑡
𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡 ℎ𝑡
. The same procedure is used for elasticity to taxmix. 
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The article set out to assess the impact of tax policy on growth in Zimbabwe. We find that tax 
policy negatively influences growth. This finding is surprising given a huge public sector in 
Zimbabwe that delivers social services to the people. Some of such services have external 
benefits which should have rendered tax policy benevolent. We find that a policy in favour of 
indirect taxation relative to direct taxation is marginally beneficial. We also find that over the 
sample period the elasticity of growth to changes in tax structure, that is, tax burden and tax mix 
has been relatively low except during the ZIMPREST period (1996-2000). Our findings agree 
with the current empirical evidence, for example, Koch et al (2005) who find a negative 
relationship between tax structure and growth in South Africa. We compute the dead weight loss 
in the economy due to inefficiency and get very alarming results. Over the 26-year period of 
study, the dead weight loss is about 6.2 % of actual growth. This is a worrisome performance. 
We recommend that government should shift away from over-reliance on taxes and probably 
create a sovereign wealth fund from the vast mineral resources. Such a fund would be used to 
fund both the development and recurrent budget. The government is certain to gain. A reduction 
in direct taxes is likely to spur expenditure and so increase indirect tax revenue collection. 
Further, institutional distortions, poor fiscal governance and other structural impediments have to 
be handled before efficiency can be attained. We further recommend structural reforms in the 
economy. However, our results are based on a very small sample and as such they are only 
preliminary. We suggest that further analysis can be made in the context of optimal tax rates. 
There is need to know if Zimbabwe is currently overtaxed or not. There is need to unlock the 
black box by examining the sources of growth and inefficiency in the Zimbabwean economy. 
Another additional area of research would be to examine the quality of public finance and its 
impact on economic growth. 
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